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Abstract 
Porter links high market share with cost leadership strategy which is based on the idea of competing on 
a price that is lower than that of the competition. But, customer-perceived quality—not low 
cost—should be the foundation of competitive strategy, because it is far more vital to long-term 
competitive position and profitability than any other factor. So, a superior alternative is to offer better 
quality vs. the competition. 
In most consumer markets a business seeking market share leadership should try to serve the middle 
class by competing in the mid-price segment; and offering quality better than that of the competition: at 
a price somewhat higher, to signify an image of quality, and to ensure that the strategy is both 
profitable and sustainable in the long run.  
Quality, however, is an intricate concept consumers generally find difficult to understand. So, they often 
use relative price and a brand’s reputation as a symbol of quality. 
Total U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice retail sales for 2008 were $2.6 Billion. There were ten package 
sizes ranging all the way from 6 oz to 128 oz. Of these the 64- and 59-oz size captured about two-thirds 
of the market at 66%. 
It is a very competitive market with 142 brands in 2008. However, we have focused analysis on 32 
brands whose 64oz- or 59oz-pack sales were over $1Million. 
We tested two hypotheses: (1) That a market leader is likely to compete in the mid-price segment, and 
(2) That the unit price of the market leader is likely to be somewhat higher than that of the nearest 
competition. Employing U.S. retail sales data for 2008 and 2007, we found that the results supported 
both hypotheses for 2008, as well as 2007. 
We also found strong support for the idea, that relative price is a strategic variable. 
We compared the results of this project with four similar studies: the U.S. Men’s Shaving Cream market, 
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the U.S. Beer market, the U.S. Shampoo market, and the U.S. Shredded/Grated Cheese market. We found 
the results to be very similar, indicating a pattern emerging for consumer markets. 
Finally, we discovered five strategic groups in the industry. 
Keywords 
U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice Market, cost leadership, price-quality segmentation, market-share 
leadership, relative price a strategic variable, strategic groups 
 
1. Introduction 
This work follows the paths of four studies: the U.S. Men’s Shaving Cream, the U.S. Beer, the U.S. 
Shampoo, and the U.S. Shredded/Grated Cheese markets (Datta, 2012, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). That 
research is based on the premise that the way to market share leadership does not lie in lower price 
founded in cost leadership strategy, as Porter (1980) suggests. Rather, it is based on the 
idea—according to the PIMS (Note 1) database research—that it is customer-perceived quality that is 
crucial to long-term competitive position and profitability. So, the answer to market share leadership 
for a business is to differentiate itself by offering quality that is better than that of the nearest 
competition (Datta, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
To make this idea operational requires two steps. The first step is to determine which price-quality 
segment to compete in? Most consumer markets can be divided in three basic price-quality segments: 
premium, mid-price, and economy. These can be extended to five by adding two more: ultra-premium 
and ultra-economy (Datta, 1996, 2012, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). The solution lies in serving the middle 
class by competing in the mid-price segment. This is the socio-economic segment that embodies about 
40% of households in America (Datta, 2011). It is also the segment that Procter & Gamble (P&G), a 
leading global consumer products company, has successfully served in the past (Datta, 2010b, 2012, 
2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
1.1 The Strategic Importance of Price Positioning 
The second step is to position the brand at a price that is somewhat higher than that of the closest 
competition in the mid-price segment. This is in accord with P&G’s practice based on the idea that 
although higher quality does deserve a “price premium”, it should not be excessive (Datta, 2010b). A 
higher price offers two advantages: (1) it promotes an image of quality, and (2) it ensures that the 
strategy is both profitable and sustainable in the long run (ibid). 
A classic example of price positioning is provided by General Motors (GM). In 1921 GM rationalized 
its product line by offering “a car for every purse and purpose”—from Chevrolet to Pontiac, to 
Oldsmobile, to Buick, to Cadillac. More importantly, GM positioned each car line at the top of its 
segment (Datta, 1996, 2010a, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
A more recent and familiar example is the economy chain, Motel 6, which has positioned itself as 
“offering the lowest price of any national chain”. Another case is Fairfield Inn. When Marriott 
introduced this new chain, it targeted it at the economy segment. And then it positioned it at the top of 
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that segment (Datta, 1996, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
1.2 Close Link between Quality and Price 
As mentioned above, customer perceived quality is the most important variable contributing to the 
long-term success of a business. However, quality cannot really be separated from price (Datta, 1996). 
Quality, in general, is a complex multi-dimensional concept that is difficult to understand. So, 
consumers generally use relative price—and a brands’ reputation--as a symbol of quality (Datta, 2010b, 
2012, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). 
 
2. A Brief History of Florida’s Citrus Growers 
Florida’s oranges are called Citrus sinesis: the sweet orange that is supposed to be a cross between a 
pummelo and a mandarin. This hybrid is a native of northeast India and the adjoining areas of 
Myanmar and China. The two most important varieties of oranges in Florida are: Valencia and Hamlin 
(Hamilton, 2009, p. 4, pp. 9-10). 
Named after a town in Spain, Valencia was introduced to Florida in 1876. Now it is known as the 
“Cadillac” of oranges, and every juice processor craves for it because of its “deep orange color, 
distinctive flavor, and high juice content” (ibid, p. 7). 
Before the 1880s the common method of growing trees was from planting seeds. Because of the hybrid 
nature of Citrus sinesis, there was no assurance that planting the seed of one variety will produce an 
identical progeny. So, H. E. Hamlin made it a daily routine of walking around his orange grove to spot 
a seedling that stood out. And that is how he was able to discover the highly productive Hamlin in 1879: 
now the best-selling orange variety in Florida (ibid, pp. 7-8). 
2.1 The Budding System Transforms Orange Tree Planting in Florida 
After 1880s the budding system became the standard commercial practice of propagating orange trees 
that is still being used today. This procedure promised earlier fruit bearing, less thorny oranges, 
and—most importantly—uniform fruit. Each tree has its genesis in a nursery, where seed for the tree’s 
rootstock is planted in a tray. In three to four months, when the seedling becomes six inches tall, it is 
transplanted into a field, or in the “container” method developed in the 1970s, a pot. After about two 
months when the seedling is ready, an incision is made in the seedling’s stock where budwood (Note 2) 
from the desired sweet variety of orange is grafted. It takes about five to six years before a tree begins 
to produce commercially (ibid, p. 8). 
Budding has transformed the way oranges are grown in Florida. Its focus on uniformity allows for 
much larger groves, because the groves do not require much interaction with individual trees: since 
each tree is expected to be identical (Hamilton, 2009, p. 9). 
2.2 Florida Citrus Growers Limit Production to Four Orange Varieties 
In the 2002-2003 season Hamlin topped Valencia in popularity in Florida, gaining 44% market share 
compared to Valencia’s 35%. While, Valencia and Hamlin are ideal for producing juice, they are not as 
good as fresh fruit. Also, while being seedless was an asset for making juice, they were considered a 
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liability by growers who believed they could grow more trees from oranges that had seeds (Hamilton, 
2009, pp. 10-11). 
In 1922 a USDA pomologist (Note 3) observed that Florida had too much variety of sweet oranges. He 
said that was a handicap against California’s just two: Navel and Valencia. A committee of orange 
growers accepted his advice, and recommended that the growers limit their orange crops to just four 
varieties of sweet oranges (ibid, p. 12). 
Whereas California had just one orange variety suitable for juice processing—Valencia—all four 
varieties of Florida oranges were good for making juice. Thus, “Florida was primed to become the 
world’s leading orange juice producer” (ibid, p. 13). 
2.3 The Birth of Florida Concentrated Orange Juice (FCOJ) 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Florida citrus growers had set their sights on the 
production and sale of fresh oranges, rather than processed juice. In 1935 a new government agency, 
the Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC), was created to represent the interests of Florida citrus 
growers. To meet the needs of World War II, the FDOC abandoned the practice of providing fresh fruit 
to consumers. Instead, it adopted the mission of figuring out how to provide orange juice with an 
agreeable taste for American troops around the world (Hamilton, 2009, p.16). 
In the history of Florida, the year 1948 occupies a special status. It is this year that after almost ten years 
of research, a band of three scientists (Note 4) was successful in perfecting a process for making a 
prepared juice that was far better than the canned juice the consumers did not like at all earlier (ibid, p. 
18). 
The concentration process, which requires heating the juice to evaporate its water content, was well 
known before. But the new process, called the “cutback” process, was such it could retain the flavor of 
orange by adding some fresh juice to the concentrate, and then freezing it. The process also created a 
more nourishing product by restoring some of the Vitamin C that was lost in heating (Hamilton, 2009, pp. 
18-20). 
The discovery of this process led to the expansion of the Florida citrus industry, and the surrounding 
industries for transporting and warehousing the juice (Copage, 2000). Another major contribution of the 
“cut-back” method was that it was able to achieve consistency because each can of the frozen orange 
concentrate was an exact copy of the one that came before it. This is important for enterprises that sell 
food products on a large scale (Hamilton, 2009, p. 20; Datta, 2018b (Note 12). 
The “cut-back” process was patented in 1948, and soon the patent was transferred from the government 
to a private business: Florida Foods. The company then entered into a contract with Vacuum Foods 
Corp. that transferred the patent to the latter. At the end of the decade, Vacuum Foods was renamed 
Minute Maid (Hamilton, 2009, pp. 20-21). 
Although the FCOJ arrived too late for WW II, it came just in time to address a crisis in the industry 
when it “was just before dying”, and Florida’s citrus growers were just “starving”. So, now Florida 
citrus growers were looking toward FCOJ as their savior. According to a USDA report, FCOJ was 
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going to return 49c to the growers for every dollar spent by the consumer: compared to just 30c for 
fresh fruit. That’s why FCOJ was dubbed by some as “The Cinderella Product” (ibid, pp. 22-23). 
In anticipation of FCOJ coming into the market, Florida orange growers decided to vastly increase their 
plantings during the 1940s and 1950s, and the Florida citrus industry continued on a spree of “glutting” 
the market driving down its price that was “slowly starving the hands that fed it” (ibid, p. 22). 
The long gestation of seven years for orange trees to mature made it very difficult for growers to 
respond quickly to fast swings in juice demand. Frequent occurrence of freezes in Florida further 
complicated this problem (ibid, p. 23).  
2.4 The Citrus Greening Epidemic 
Citrus greening, also known as HLB, is a serious disease that is radically affecting citrus production all 
over the world. Thanks to HLB, orange production in Florida has been declining for years because of 
the Asian citrus psyllid, a tiny winged insect, that spreads this bacterial disease. Greening has destroyed 
groves, and has raised the cost of crop maintenance (Note 13). 
Now more growers are developing methods to fight greening (Note 5). When trees resistant to HLB are 
planted, not only will the cost of producing oranges will go down, but both the fruit and juice yields 
will go up, too (Note 6). 
According to one estimate, for the year beginning Oct.1, 2018 Florida may end up producing 70 
million boxes of citrus fruit, a 56% jump over 45 million the year before: the smallest crop since 1945 
(Note 5).  
2.5 Frequent Freezes: The Curse of Florida Agriculture  
A constant feature of Florida’s agriculture is the repeated occurrence of freezes that have plagued the 
citrus industry ever since its inception. Between 1835 and 1989 Florida suffered from thirteen major 
freezes, of which five were impact freezes. An impact freeze is a freeze so severe that it destroys entire 
groves across the state, killing both mature and young citrus trees. This causes an intense economic 
impact on the citrus industry, and growers feel pressured to move farther south, where temperatures are 
warmer (Note 14). 
The 1835 freeze is considered an impact freeze because it ended efforts to commercially grow citrus in 
South Georgia, southeast South Carolina, and in the northern part of Florida (Note 7). 
The back-to-back freezes between December 29th, 1894 and February 7, 1895 were also impact freezes 
that destroyed most of the citrus crop at that time. On December 29, 1894, Orlando reached an all-time 
low of 18F, and West Palm Beach recorded a low of 24F (Note 7). 
The 1989 freeze was the fifth impact freeze in Florida since 1834 (Note 14) and some call it “the freeze 
of the century” (Note 8). This freeze resulted in almost total destruction of commercial citrus growing 
north of Interstate 4. As a result, there was a heavy migration of citrus groves from Lake county in 
central Florida—north of Interstate 4—to Hendry and Collier counties in deep-south Florida (Note 9). 
Freezes are not the only natural calamity Florioda has to encounter recurrently; hurricanes are another 
menace Florida faces on a regular basis. For example, Hurricane Charley seriously damaged the citrus 
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industry in 2004 (Note 10). In 2018, because of Hurricane Irma Florida’s citrus industry experienced its 
worst growing season since World War II (Note 11). 
2.6 Severe Freezes Force Florida to Import Orange Juice from Brazil 
Until the 1980s Florida was the global leader in orange juice production. However, due to back-to-back 
freezes Florida orange production stumbled from 207 million 90-pound boxes in 1979-1980, to 104 
million boxes five years later: a drop of almost 50% (Hamilton, 2009, p. 110). 
So as not to lose its increasing customer base, the State of Florida approached Brazil, then the second 
largest orange juice producer, to make up the shortage. The state directed men and money into Brazil 
for building a strong orange juice processing center in that country (ibid, p. 110). 
As of 2004, Brazil’s larger groves were producing oranges at one dollar per box, while in Florida the 
cost was fifty percent higher. This is because in Brazil there are are fewer environmental regulations, 
and both land and labor are cheaper. So, the U.S. has imposed a tariff on import of orange juice from 
Brazil to protect Florida growers (Hamilton, 2009, p. 111; Walker, 2009). 
According to one estimate, Brazilian companies, like Cutrale and Citrusuco, owned about 40% of 
Florida’s orange juice processing capacity in 2004 (Hamilton, 2009, p. 122).  
2.7 Vanishing Orange Groves means Florida Citrus is Losing Its Identity 
The impact of Brazil over Florida goes beyond the processing of orange juice. Brazil’s vast supply of 
land to grow oranges is depressing the value of Florida’s citrus groves. Florida was once synonymous 
with oranges, but not anymore. In the words of Hamilton (2009, pp. 3-4, italics added): 
 Orange trees in Florida are relatively few and far between. They no longer line the highways as 
they used to, sprouting juice stands along the way. Whole groves are being uprooted to make 
room for the state’s tourists and retirees. 
 [The] actual number of juice oranges the state grows is declining. Oranges from Brazil, not 
Florida, supply North America and the world with most of its juice. 
 
3. A Brief History of Florida Orange Juice Processors 
In Florida, there are three major orange juice producers: Tropicana, the market leader, owned by 
PepsiCo; Minute Maid, and Simply Orange, owned by Coca-Cola Co.; and Florida’s Natural, an arm of 
Florida’s Natural Growers cooperative.  
3.1 Tropicana 
Anthony Rossi, an immigrant from Sicily, founded Tropicana in 1947 (Note 15). Beatrice Co. bought 
Tropicana in 1978. In 1988 Seagram Co. beame the next owner of Tropicana, and ten years later 
Seagram sold it to PepsiCo (Note 16). 
In 1954 Tropicana pioneedred a flash pasteurization method that raised the temperature of 
freshly-squeezed orange juice briefly that extended its shelf-life to three months, and yet maintained its 
flavor. As a result, the company introduced ready-to-serve (RTS) chilled orange juice in the market 
(Note 17). 
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Tropicana was the run-away market leader of the U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice market with a share of 
39% in 2008 (Table 1). 
3.2 Minute Maid 
As mentioned ealier, the patent for Florida citrus concentrate was eventually transferred to Vacuum 
Foods, which, a decade later, was renamed Minute Maid.  
Minute Maid recruited the famous crooner Bing Crosby to sing commercials for its FCOJ. Edwin 
Moore, the lead-inventor of FCOJ, believes that Crosby deserves a lot of credit “in FCOJ’s almost 
instant transformation into a beverage favorite” (Hamilton, 2009, p. 26; italics added). 
In 1960 Minute Maid became a part of Coca-Cola Co (Coke) (Note 18). 
To take advantage of the rising segment of ready-to-serve (RTS) chilled orange juice, Minute Maid 
decided to enter it in 1973 (Note 18). 
In the 1990s Coke began selling Minute Maid’s processing plants to a Brazilian Co., Cutrale. This is 
because Coke came to realize that the juice-processing operations of Minute Maid yielded an ROI of 
just 8%, compared to 25% on the marketing end of the business (Hamilton, 2009, p. 112). Minute Maid 
was the runner-up in the Refrigerated Orange Juice market with a share of 15% in 2008 (Table 1). 
3.3 Simply Orange 
The Coca-Cola Co. launched Simply Orange pasteurized orange juice in 2001. In 2003 the company 
opened a multi-million dollar packaging plant in Florida to compete against Tropicana’s pasteurized (or 
“Not From Concentrate”) orange juice (Hamilton, 2009, p. 136).  
In a short seven years Simply Orange was able to reach a market share not far from that of Minute 
Maid (Table 1). 
3.4 Florida’s Natural 
Florida’s Natural brand is owned by a cooperative, Florida’s Natural Growers, that was founded in 
1933 (Note 19). Like Tropicana, Florida’s Natural also sells pasteurized orange juice. It had a market 
share of 10.8% in 2008. 
  
4. How Pasteurized or “Not From Concentrate” Orange Juice Is Processed 
The pasteurized RTS is the most popular variety of orange juice in Florida. As mentioned earlier, 
Tropicana was the inventor of the flash pasteurization process. To be able to supply pasteurized orange 
juice year round requires large-scale storage capacity. So, Tropicana initially came up with a simple 
solution to address this problem. It stored frozen slabs of freshly-squeezed juice in above-ground 
tunnels (Hamilton, 2009, p. 140; Walker, 2009). 
But, to keep up with the rising demand of RTS—and Tropicana’s success as the leading RTS 
provider—the company began exloring cheaper modes of storing RTS. So, in the nineties Tropicana 
replaced most of these tunnels with a cheaper—but much more complex—technology of aseptic 
storage tanks. This technology calls for stripping the juice of oxygen, a process known as “dearation”, 
so that he juice does not oxidize in the million-gallon tanks in which it can be stored for over a year 
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(ibid). 
However, when the juice is stripped of oxygen it is also stipped of flavor-providing chemicals. So, the 
juice processors engage the services of fragrance companies, such as, Calvin Klein and Dior, to 
engineer flavor packs to add back to the juice to make it taste fresh (Hamilton, 2009, Ch. 12, 13). 
Formulations of flavor packs are determined by the juice processors. For example, the flavor packs for 
the North American market contain ethyl butyrate. This is the chemical that is in the fragrance of 
fresh-squeezed oranges: a flavor Americans like. On the other hand, Brazilians and Mexicans have a 
different taste. Likewise, Minute Maid has a candy-like flavor (Hamilton, 2009, Ch. 12-13). 
4.1 “Tunnel” Storage vs. Storage in Aseptic Tank Farms 
With asceptic tanks, the juice is heated before it gets into the tank, and then again before it goes into the 
package for sale. But, when juice is stored in above-ground tunnels in frozen blocks, it is heated only 
when it is ready to go into a package. But, more the juice is heated, the more its freshly-squeezed taste 
is depleted (Hamilton, 2009, p. 141). 
4.2 RTS Orange Juice from Reconstituted Frozen Concentrate (“Recon”) 
In 1950 per capita consumption of processed orange juice—concentrate, canned, and pasteurized—was 
8 pounds, but by 1960, this figure had more than doubled to 20 pounds, or 2.3 gallons: with orange 
juice from concentrate growing the most at 16 pounds (Hamiltin, 2009, pp. 25-26). 
After the introduction of pasteurized orange juice by Tropicana in 1954, the sales of chilled orange 
juice—later labeled ready-to-serve juice (RTS) —began to rise. To meet this growing demand, makers 
of concentrated orange juice discovered a new process—called “Recon”—of producing RTS by 
reconstituting frozen concentrate”. And soon the sales of “Recon” started to rise, too (Hamilton, 2009, p. 
24, p. 130).  
“Recon” has one main advantage over pasteurized juice, and that is that it is cheaper to produce. This is 
because it is made from space-saving frozen concentrate which stores compactly, and unlike 
pasteurized juice stored in aseptic tanks, does not require epsensive storage infrastructure. Generally, 
“Recon” processors add water only at the point of distribution, or at retail. As a result, while storage of 
concentrate costs about one penny per pound per year, storing pasteurized juice costs about 20-25 times 
as much (Hamilton, p. 130). 
High storage cost of pasteurized juice was not the only factor Tropicana was having a hard time 
competing with the likes of Minute Maid. Another was the heightened competition from “Recon”. 
More importantly, still another reason was that the freezes that hit Florida in 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 
and 1989 had caused devastation in its citrus industry. So, “Recon” processors began to import 
Brazilian concentrate to meet consumer demand. However, Tropicana was unable to do so because 
technology did not exist then to move large tanks of liquid orange juice. 
4.3 NFC and the Power of Product Positioning/Promotion 
So, Tropicana hired a market research firm to address the dilemma it was facing. The research firm 
recommended that in future Tropicana should make and market only “Recon”. However, Allan Morris, 
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then in-charge of orange and juice procurement, had a different opinion. First, he argued that switcing 
to “Recon” will improve quality—because the juice will taste better. He said that while you can hide 
your mistakes in an evaporator (when making “Recon”) you cannot do so in making pasteurized juice. 
Then turning around, he presented the following counter-argument (Hamilton, 2009, pp. 131-132; 
italics added): 
 [T]he consumer wants something, the closest they can find to fresh-squeezed, and you can 
market…the concept of an orange juice that [hasn’t] been manufactured as much and it will 
have some merit. 
Agreeing with Morris, Spencer Vogue, Tropicana’s President, made a bold move. He decided that 
“we’re going to tell the consumer that our product is not made from concentrate”. Persuaded that 
consumers judge “juice by the cover”, he decided to “tinker with words rather than with substance.” So, 
Tropicana began promoting its Pure Premium brand as “Not From Concentrate” (NFC) to differentiate 
its pasteurization process as being superior to the concentrate roots of “Recon”. In addition, it also 
started charging more for it both to cover its higher storage costs, but alo to promote an image of 
quality, as we have suggested (Hamilton, 2009, pp. 130-132; italics added).  
Thanks to Vogue’s decision, Tropicana’s sales exceeded all expectations. In the next five years—thanks 
to NFC’s powerful promotion—Tropicana doubled its sales volume and almost tripled its profits. The 
industry-wide sales of NFC, too, jumped from $653 million in 1990 to $1.03 billion in 1995 (ibid, p. 
133). 
Taste tests confirmed why the NFC campaign was so successful. The essence of tasters’ conclusion was 
that even if NFC “didn’t taste as good but I know it’s better for me and better for my family”. The 
primary reason for its popularity was that “it was perceived as being fresh squeezed: and that was better 
than having to go through some terrible process of concentrating and then adding back water”. 
Surprisingly, the consumers expressed their preference for Tropicana, even as Tropicana executives felt 
that NFC tasted no better than “Recon” (ibid, pp. 133-134; italics added). 
4.4 It Is Customer-perceived Quality That Counts 
As we have mentioned earlier, it is customer-perceived quality that is critical to long-term competitive 
position and profitability of a business. Regardless of what objective measures of quality may be, it is 
how customers perceive quality that affects their brand preference. Furthermore, as we have indicated 
above in section 5.0 that covers flavor packs, determining how orange juice tastes is highly subjective, 
and therefore, there can be no single standard for it. 
4.5 Coca-Cola’s Simply Orange Enters the NFC Segment 
Toward the end of the 20th century NFC was the only type of orange juice that was still growing, a 
category dominated by Tropicana and Florida’s Natural. This was a clear indication that NFC had 
become a consumer favorite. So, now every brand and processor wanted a piece of this pie (Hamilton, 
2009, p. 114). 
To take advantage of this wave, the Coca-Cola Co. introduced a new brand, Simply Orange, that 
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offered an NFC version of orange juice in 2001 (Note 20). Thanks to Coke’s marketing muscle, Simply 
Orange was able to garner a market share of 14.1% in 2008, just behind Minute Maid (Table 1). 
 
5. The U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice Market—Price-Quality Segmentation Profile (Note 21) 
This study is based on U.S. retail sales for 2008 and 2007 (Note 22). The data includes total dollar and 
unit sales, no-promotion dollar and unit sales, and promotion dollar and unit sales (Note 23). 
U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice retail sales for 2008 were $2.6 Billion. It is a very competitive market 
with 142 brands in 2008. There were 14 pack-sizes ranging all the way from 6 oz to 128 oz. Of these, 
the 64-59 oz size captured two-thirds of the market at 66%. So, we have concentrated our analysis on 
32 brands each of whose 64 or 59 oz pack sales for 2008 were over $1 Million. 
5.1 Hierarchical Clustering as the Primary Instrument of Statistical Analysis 
We have used cluster analysis as the primary statistical tool in this study. As suggested by Ketchen and 
Shook (1996), we have taken several steps to make this effort as objective as possible. 
 First, this study is not ad-hoc, but is founded in a theoretical framework, as laid out below. 
 Second, we are fortunate that we were able to get sales data for our study for two years. Thus, this 
data provided a robust vehicle for subjecting cluster consistency and reliability to an additional test. 
 Third, we wanted to use two different techniques—KMeans and Hierarchical—to add another 
layer of cluster consistency and reliability. However, we found Hierarchical cluster analysis to be 
superior in meeting that test. So, we did not consider it necessary to use the KMeans technique.  
5.2 Theoretical Foundation for Determining Number of Clusters—And Their Meaning 
As already stated, a major purpose of this paper is to identify the market share leader and determine the 
price-quality segment—based on unit price—it is competing in. 
An important question in performing cluster analysis is determining the number of clusters based on an 
a priori theory. Most consumer markets can be divided in three basic price-quality segments: premium, 
mid-price, and economy. These three basic segments can be extended to five: with the addition of 
super-premium and ultra-economy segments (Datta, 1996).  
Therefore, three represents the minimum and five the maximum number of clusters (Datta, 2012, 2017, 
2018a, 2018b). 
An equally crucial issue is to figure out what each cluster (e.g., economy, mid-price, and premium) 
really means. 
Perhaps a good way to understand what each price-quality segment stands for in real life is to look at a 
socio-economic lifestyle profile of America. It reveals six classes. Each class is associated with a 
price-quality segment typified by the retail stores where they generally shop: each a symbol of their 
lifestyle (Datta, 2011) (Note 24).  
5.3 Guidelines for Cluster Consistency and Reliability 
In addition to laying a theoretical foundation for the number of clusters, we set up the following 
guidelines to enhance cluster consistency and reliability (Datta, 2012, 2017, 2018a, 2018b): 
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 In general, there should be a clean break between contiguous clusters. 
 The anchor clusters—the top and the bottom—should be robust. In a cluster-analysis project 
limited to a range of three to five clusters, a robust cluster is one whose membership remains constant 
from three- to four-, or four- to five-cluster solutions. 
 Finally, we followed a step-by-step procedure to determine the optimal solution. First, we start with 
three clusters. Thus, the bottom cluster obviously becomes the economy segment and the top cluster the 
premium segment. Next, we go to four clusters, and tentatively call them: economy, mid-price, premium, 
and super-premium. Then we go to five clusters. If the membership of the bottom cluster remains 
unchanged from what it was in the four-cluster result, it clearly implies that the ultra-economy segment 
does not exist. Next, if the membership of the top cluster also remains the same from a four- to a 
five-cluster solution, then the top cluster becomes the super-premium segment. This means that even in a 
five-cluster solution we have only four price-quality segments: economy, mid-price, premium, and 
super-premium. It implies that either the premium or the mid-price segment consists of two sub-segments 
(Table 1). 
In addition, whenever possible, we have tried to seek external evidence to validate the results of cluster 
analysis. For example, many companies identify on their websites a certain brand(s) as a premium or 
luxury brand. Another case is that of P&G which clearly says it does not compete in the economy 
segment (Datta, 2010b). 
5.4 Testing Hypotheses  
 I—That the market-share leader would be a member of the mid-price segment.  
 II—That the market-share leader would carry a price tag that is higher than that of the nearest 
competition.  
5.5 Results of Cluster Analysis 
In Table 1 we present the results of 2008 Hierarchical cluster analysis for the 64- and 59-oz packs 
which had 66% market share in 2008. This analysis is restricted to 32 brands each of whose sales of the 
64- or 59-oz packs were over $1 Million (Note 25). 
Tropicana, owned by Pepsi Co., was the runaway market leader with an overall market share of 38.9%. 
It is a member of the mid-price segment, a result that strongly supports Hypothesis I. 
Minute Maid, owned by the Coca Cola Co., is the runner up with a total market share of 14.6%, and a 
unit price of $2.86 that is lower than Tropicana’s $3.19. So, this result, too, supports Hypothesis II. 
5.6 What Are Private Brands? 
It is important to clarify what private brands are. These are brands made exclusively for individual 
retailers, e.g., a supermarket, or a drug store. Usually, such brands are targeted to the economy segment, 
and, as such, are generally sold at prices lower than those of major name brands. One reason, retailers 
like private brands is because private brands tend to be more profitable than name brands (Datta, 
2018b). 
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5.7 Relative Price a Strategic Variable 
Finally, we performed one more test to determine the consistency and reliability of the results of cluster 
analysis in this study. So, we ranked the unit price of each brand—both for 2008 and 2007. 
For both years, and all three measures of bivariate correlation—Pearson, and non-parametric measures 
Kendall’s tau__b, and Spearman’s rho—were found to be significant at an amazing 0.01 level! 
We believe these surprising results—that cover such a large number of brands—became possible only 
because management in the U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice market must have been treating relative 
price as a strategic variable, as we have suggested. 
While the price of a brand, compared to its nearest competition, may change over time, it is unlikely to 
change much from one year to the next. This is significant not only for the market share leader, but also 
for every brand no matter which price-quality segment it is competing in. 
Another conclusion one can draw from such incredible results is that the U.S. Refrigerated Orange 
Juice market is highly competitive. 
5.8 A Pattern Emerging for Consumer Markets 
Now let us compare the results of this project to similar studies of four consumer markets: (1) The U.S. 
Men’s Shaving Cream (Datta, 2012), (2) The U.S. Beer (Datta, 2017), (3) The U.S. Shampoo (Datta, 
2018a), and (4) The U.S. Shredded/Grated Cheese (Datta, 2018b). The results reported here very 
closely match those revealed by the above research. 
Similarly, all four studies, like this one, concluded that relative price was a strategic variable.  
It is clear from the foregoing that the results of this study do not just stand by themselves, but, rather, 
are part of an emerging pattern in consumer markets. 
 
Table 1. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: The U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice Market, 2008 (32 
Cases) 
Price-Quality 
Segment 
Brand Name 
Size 
Oz 
Upr 
2008 
Cluster 
Center 
MktShr 
% 
TotalBrand 
Sales2008$M 
Super-premium NO COMPANY LISTED 64 $9.30 $8.77 0.1% 2.3 
  NAKED 64 $8.52 
 
0.1% 3.6 
  JUICE HARVEST 64 $8.49 
 
0.1% 1.8 
Premium I ODWALLA 64 $6.91 $6.27 0.5% 13.7 
  JUST SQUEEZED 64 $6.62 
 
0.2% 5.9 
  ORGANIC VALLEY 64 $6.07 
 
0.2% 4.2 
  UNCLE MATT’S 59 $5.47 
 
0.1% 1.8 
Premium II NATALIE’S ORCHID ISLAND 64 $5.16 $4.55 0.3% 6.7 
  SUN HARVEST 64 $4.59 
 
0.1% 2.4 
  PRIVATE BRANDS 59OZ 59 $3.90 
 
0.0%   
Mid-Price INDIAN RIVER SELECT 59 $3.46 $3.21 0.3% 7.8 
  SIMPLY ORANGE 59 $3.43 
 
14.1% 364.4 
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  TROPICANA 59OZ (Note 26) 59 $3.20 
 
0.0%   
  MINUTE MAID 59OZ (Note 26) 59 $3.19 
 
0.0%   
  TROPICANA 64OZ 64 $3.19 
 
38.9% 1,004.6 
  FLORIDA’S NATURAL (Note 26) 64 $3.10 
 
10.8% 278.9 
  MINUTE MAID 64OZ 64 $2.86 
 
14.6% 377.6 
Economy FLORIDA’S CHOICE 64 $2.55 $2.20 0.1% 2.1 
  DONALD DUCK 64 $2.44 
 
0.6% 15.5 
  DOLE 64 $2.44 
 
0.5% 12.9 
  COUNTRY FRESH 64 $2.40 
 
0.1% 3.6 
  PRIVATE BRANDS 64OZ 64 $2.39 
 
15.0% 387.4 
  KEMPS 64 $2.38 
 
0.1% 2.7 
  HOME MAKER 64 $2.25 
 
0.1% 2.9 
  WELLS BLUE BUNNY 64 $2.22 
 
0.1% 2.6 
  ANDERSON ERICKSON 64 $2.17 
 
0.1% 3.0 
  DEAN  64 $2.13 
 
0.2% 5.7 
  PRAIRIE FARMS 64 $2.03 
 
0.2% 4.8 
  LAND O LAKES 64 $2.00 
 
0.2% 4.4 
  TREE RIPE 59 $1.95 
 
0.6% 15.1 
  HILAND 64 $1.84 
 
0.3% 6.7 
  ROBERTS 64 $1.80 
 
0.2% 4.5 
  Total 64 and 59 Ounces (32 cases) $3.01  98.7% $2,550 
  Total Sales (all sizes)       100% 2,582  
 
5.9 The Role of Promotion 
For 2008, promotional sales averaged 46% of total net sales for 39 brands with sales over $1 Million 
that represented 99% of total net Refrigerated Orange Juice sales. This score matches very closely with 
the mark of 48% for Lager Beer, and 45% for Shredded/Grated Cheese: all three part of the larger food 
industry (Datta, 2018b). 
We performed bivariate correlation between total (net) sales vs. promotional (PROMO) sales. The 
results were significant for all three measures—Pearson, Kendall’s tau_b, and Spearman’s rho—at the 
0.01 level. 
In Table 2, we present 2008 promotional sales data for 14 brands with sales over $5 Million. The 
highlights of the results are as follows: 
 First let us look at the “Big Three”: Tropicana—owned by the Pepsi Co.—Minute Maid, and 
Simply Orange—owned by the Coca Cola Co. All three are mid-price brands, and all fall in the Heavy 
group. 
 Next comes Florida’s Natural (FN). It is also a mid-price brand which is owned by Florida’s 
Natural Growers, a Florida agricultural cooperative. Unlike the “Big Three,” FN is a member of the 
Very Heavy group. It seems that facing three formidable competitors, FN has chosen to use a higher 
level of promotion than the “Big Three” to hold its own. 
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 Finally, there are the Private Brands, which as a group, had a 2008 market share of 15% (Table 1). 
They are part of the economy segment, as is usually the case. Normally, a lower price should not need 
heavy promotion. However, private brands tend to be more profitable than name brands. So, it appears 
the retailers were able to employ a lower price as well as heavy promotion at the same time (Datta, 
2018a).  
 
Table 2. Percentage of Promo Sales to Total (Net) Sales: Refrigerated Orange Juice, 2008 
 
PromoLevel Sales$ Millions %PROMO 
Grand Total 
 
2,582 45.8% 
Brands with 2008 Sales >$5M (14 ) 
  
  
TREE RIPE  Very Heavy 15 85.6% 
FLORIDA’S NATURAL  
 
279 60.8% 
MINUTE MAID  Heavy 378 46.9% 
TROPICANA  
 
1,005 46.1% 
DONALD DUCK  
 
15 45.5% 
DOLE  
 
13 45.3% 
SIMPLY ORANGE  
 
364 42.5% 
HILAND  
 
7 42.3% 
ODWALLA  
 
14 41.2% 
PRIVATE BRANDS 
 
387 40.1% 
INDIAN RIVER SELECT  Moderate 8 36.3% 
DEAN  
 
6 31.6% 
NATALIE’S ORCHID ISLAND JC CMP  Light 7 14.2% 
JUST SQUEEZED    6 0.2% 
 
6. Strategic Groups in the Refrigerated Orange Juice Market, 2008 
 We found five strategic groups in this market: 
 1. The PepsiCo—Market Leader 
 Tropicana—38.9% 
 2. The Coca Cola Co.—Runner-up 
 Minute Maid—14.6% 
 Simply Orange—14.1% 
 3. Florida’s Natural Growers (cooperative) 
 Florida’s Natural—10.8% 
 4. Private Brands—15% 
 5. Small Family-owned Enterprises—5.3% 
6.1 The PepsiCo, Inc. 
PepsiCo was established through the merger of Pepsi Cola Co. and Frito Lay Co. in 1965. Its sales for 
2017 were $63 Billion (Note 27). PepsiCo acquired Tropicana in 1998 from Seagram Co. In 2008 
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Tropicana was a clear market leader with a share of 39%: far and above Runner-up Minute Maid’s 15%, 
and 10% more than the shares of Minute Maid and Simply Orange combined. 
 
 
Figure 1. Strategic Groups: U.S. Refrigerated Orange Juice Market 
 
6.2 Coca-Cola Co. 
The company was founded in 1886 in Atlanta, GA. Its annual sales for 2017 were $35 Billion (Note 28). 
Minute Maid, bought by Coca-Cola Co. in 1960, was the runner-up, with a market share of 14.6%. 
Right behind Minute Maid is Simply Orange which was introduced in 2001. Riding the NFC wave, 
Simply Orange was able, in seven short years, to catapult itself to a market share of 14.1% by 2008 
(Table 1). 
6.3 Florida’s Natural Growers  
This Florida cooperative is owned by Florida’s orange growers, and came into being in 1933. In 2008 
the coop’s brand, Florida’s Natural (FN), had a market share of 10.8% (Table 1). It is worth noting that, 
unlike PepsiCo, or Coca Cola, FN is not importing oranges or orange juice from Brazil. Thus, it is the 
only major orange juice producer that is still making and selling orange juice from oranges grown in 
Florida (Note 19). 
6.4 The Private Brands Group 
The Private Brands Group posted a respectable showing with a market share of 15% in 2008 (Table 1). 
Now let us compare this with the group’s record in the Shredded/Grated Cheese market where the 
group did phenomenally well with a massive 2008 market share of 49%. With the exception of Kraft 
and Sargento, with market shares of 28% and 9%, respectively, the rest of the competition consisted of 
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small brands (Datta, 2018b). On the contrary, the group was facing formidable competition in the 
Orange Juice market facing several major brands: Tropicana, Minute Maid, Simply Orange, and 
Florida’s Natural, all of which collectively had captured a huge market share of 78%. Clearly, while the 
competitive environment in the Orange Juice market was quite dauning for private brands, the 
Shredded/Grated Cheese market provided an ideal arena for them because of the proliferation of small 
brands in that market. 
6.5 Small Family-owned Enterprises 
Finally, there were 27 small family-owned businesses with an overall market share of 5.3%.  
6.6 Orange Juice Market on a Decling Trend 
The demand for U.S. orange juice has been on a downward trajectory for a long time. The market 
declined by 50% over a sixteen-year period between 2001-02 to 2016-17. In their magazine the Florida 
Citrus Industry (FCI) points out that one reason for this decline in demand is higher prices because of 
lower production, and this, in turn, has caused consumers to switch to other juices and beverages (Note 
6).  
Second, FCI says some nutritionists and physicians have been faulting orange juice for its high sugar 
content, which they claim leads to obesity. But, FCI argues that although per-capita consumtion of 
non-diet soda is ten times as high as orange juice, health care experts are “not attacking soft drinks as 
much as orange juice” Note 6). 
Third, while orange juice does contain natural sugars, it is like any other 100% fruit juice (Note 6). 
Fourth, orange juice is remarkably high in vitamin C, and contains potassium citrate, vitamins and 
other compounds that may act as anti-oxidants in the body (Note 6). 
Fifth, the nutritional attributes of orange juice may help to support body’s immune system and protect 
cells against free radicals (Note 6). 
Finally, if sugar were the cause of obesity, almost half of American population would have lost weight 
when they swithched to diet sodas. But that did not happen (Note 6). 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study is based on the idea that in most consumer markets, a business seeking market-share 
leadership should try to serve the middle class by competing in the mid-price segment; and offering 
quality better than that of the competition: at a somewhat higher price to connote an image of quality, 
and to ensure that the strategy is both profitable and sustainable in the long run. The middle class is the 
socio-economic segment that represents about 40% of households in America. 
Quality, however, is a complex concept that consumers generally find difficult to comprehend. So, they 
often use relative price and a brand’s reputation as a symbol of quality. 
The Refrigerated Orange Juice market is very competitive; it generated $2.6 Billion sales in 2008. We 
have focused our analysis on 64- and 59-oz packs which, together, accounted for about two-thirds of 
the market at 66% in 2008. This segment includes 32 brands each of whose 64-59 oz sales were over 
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$1 Million. 
The main objective of this study is to test two hypotheses: (1) That the market leader would be a member 
of the mid-price segment; and (2) That the market leader would carry a price tag higher than that of the 
nearest competition. 
Employing Hierarchical cluster analysis, we found that Tropicana, the market leader, and Minute Maid, 
the runner-up, were members of the mid-price segment for both 2008 and 2007. Second, Minute Maid 
had a unit price that was lower than that of Tropicana for both years. Thus, these results supported both 
Hypothesis I and II. 
To determine the consistency and reliability of the results of cluster analysis, we found bivariate 
correlation of unit price rank data of each brand for 2008 and 2007 to be significant at a remarkable 
0.01 level. 
An important conclusion one can draw from such an amazing result is that the management in the U.S. 
Refrigerated Orange Juice market must have been treating relative price as a strategic variable, as we 
have suggested. 
We compared the results of this project with four similar studies: the U.S. Men’s Shaving Cream 
market, the U.S. Beer market, the U.S. Shampoo market, and the U.S. Shredded/Grated Cheese market. 
We found the results to be very similar, indicating a pattern emerging for consumer markets. 
Similarly, all four above-mentioned studies concluded that relative price was a strategic variable. 
Promotion played an important role in the industry, because bivariate correlation between net sales and 
promotional sales was significant at 0.01% level, for both 2008 and 2007. The other four consumer 
markets mentioned above also reported similar results. 
We found five strategic groups in the market: (1) The PepsiCo, (2) The Coca-Cola Co., (3) Florida’s 
Natural Growers [cooperative], (4) The Private Brands Group, and (5) Small Family-owned 
Enterprises. 
Before the 1880s the common method of growing trees was from planting seeds. After 1880s the 
budding system became the standard practice of breeding orange trees, because it made it possible that 
each variety of orange seedling planted will yield identical fruit. Budding system’s focus on uniformity 
has transformed the industry as it allows for much larger groves; this is because the growers do not 
need to have much interaction with individual trees since all are going to be alike. 
In the twenties a committee of orange growers, Florida Citrus Exchange, recommended that the 
growers limit their orange crops to just four varieties of sweet oranges. Whereas California had just one 
orange variety suitable for juice processing—Valencia—all four varieties of Florida oranges were good 
for making juice. And that included Valencia, known as the “Cadillac” of oranges. Thus, Florida was 
set to become the world’s leading orange juice producer. 
The year 1948 occupies a special place in the history of Florida citrus, This is the year when a band of 
three scientists finally successed in producing frozen orange juice concentrate. The patent for this 
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process was soon transferred to a private company that later renamed itself Minute Maid which was 
acquired by the Coca-Cola Co. in 1960. 
In 1954 Tropicana invented a flash pasteurization method that raised the shelf-life of orange juice to 
three months. Consequently, the company introduced ready-to-serve (RTS) chilled orange juice. In 1998 
Tropicana was acquired by the PepsiCo from Seagrram Co. 
Due to back-to-back freezes in the 1980s, Florida’s citrus production declined by about 50%. So, the 
Government of Florida enlisted the help of Brazil to make up this shortfall. In 2004 Brazilian 
companies, like Cutrale and Citrusuco, owned about 40% of Florida’s orange juice processing capacity. 
After the introduction of pasteurized orange juice by Tropicana in 1954, the sales of RTS began to go 
up. To meet this growing demand, makers of concentrated orange juice soon discovered a 
process—called “Recon”—of producing RTS orange juice from frozen concentrate. As a result, the 
sales of “Recon” started to rise, too. And in time it became a major threat to Tropicana.  
“Recon’s” major advantage over pasteurized RTS juice is that it is cheaper to produce. This is because 
it is made from space-saving frozen concentrate which stores compactly, whereas storing the 
pasteurized juice requires a large-scale infrastructure. While the storage of concentrate costs about one 
penny per pound per year, the latter costs about 20-25 times as much. 
To address the increasing popularity of “Recon”, Tropicana’s Board of directors made two surprising 
decisions: (1) In the future the company is going to promote Tropicana’s Pure Premium brand as “Not 
From Concentrate” (NFC) to differentiate its pasteurization process as being superior to the 
concentrate roots of “Recon”, and (2) It raised the price of Tropicana’s Pure Premium brand over 
“Recon” brands, both to reflect NFC’s higher storage cost, as well as to project an image of quality, as 
we have suggested in this paper.  
Taste tests confirmed why the NFC campaign was so successful. The primary reason for its preference 
was that consumers perceived it as being fresh squeezed, even though Tropicana executives felt that 
NFC tasted no better than “Recon”.  
Thanks to this bold decision, Tropicana’s sales exceeded all expectations. In the next five years—thanks 
to NFC’s powerful promotion—Tropicana doubled its sales volume and almost tripled its profits; and 
by 2008, Tropicana had become the market leader with a commanding market share of 39%.  
To take advantage of the NFC wave, the Coca-Cola Co. introduced a new brand, Simply Orange, that 
offered an NFC version of orange juice in 2001. Thanks to Coke’s marketing prowess, Simply Orange 
was able to gain a market share of 14.1% in 2008, just behind Minute Maid.  
Brazil’s vast supply of land to grow oranges is depressing the value of Florida’s citrus groves. Florida 
was once synonymous with oranges, but not anymore. Orange trees in Florida are now relatively few 
and far between. They no longer line the highways as they used to, and whole groves are being 
uprooted to make room for the state’s tourists and retirees. The number of juice oranges the state grows 
is declining. Today oranges from Brazil, not Florida, supply North America and the world with most of 
its juice. 
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Citrus greening, also known as HLB, is a serious disease because of which orange production in 
Florida has been declining for years. However, now more growers are developing methods to fight the 
disease. And when trees resistant to HLB are planted, not only will the cost of producing oranges go 
down, and both fruit and juice yield will go up, too. 
The demand for U.S. orange juice has been going down for a long time. One reason is that lower 
orange production has caused prices of orange juice to go up, which has caused consumers to switch to 
alternative juices and beverages. Second, according to Florida Citrus Industry (FCI) t health care 
experts have wrogly been blaming orange juice for its high sugar content, which they claim leads to 
obesity. They argue that these experts do not recognize various health attributes of orange juice, 
especially vitamin C. 
We found five strategic groups in the market: (1) The PepsiCo, (2) The Coca-Cola Co., (3) Florida’s 
Natural Growers [cooperative], (4) The Private Brands Group, and (5) Small Family-owned 
Enterprises. 
In this study we have relied deeply on Alyssa Hamilton for her incisive book on orange juice. An 
underlying theme of Hamilton is that the large orange juice processors have been successful in creating 
an aura of “golden goodness” around the product. She says we as a society don’t pay much attention to 
processed food like orange juice that is advertised as “pure, fresh, and additive free”. One factor that is 
partially to blame for this situation is widespread consumer ignorance about how orange juice is 
processed and advertised. 
Finally, she suggests that regardless of what and how much information major orange juice sellers may 
be willing to reveal to the public, their communications should at least be truthful. 
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Note 9. https://www.theledger.com/article/LK/20091225/News/608119147/LL/ 
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Note 10. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/17/us/hurricane-charley-agriculture-hurricane-badly-hurt- 
florida-crops.html 
Note 11. http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-cfb-nsf-florida-citrus-season-worst-20180614- 
story.html 
Note 12. For example, take the case of Kraft cheese. 
Note 13. https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/03/180326140209.htm 
Note 14. http://www.flcitrusmutual.com/industry-issues/weather/freeze_timeline.aspx 
Note 15. https://www.tropicana.com/our-story 
Note 16. https://www.thedailymeal.com/drink/9-things-you-didn-t-know-about-tropicana 
Note 17. http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/tropicana-products-inc-history/ 
Note 18. https://www.minutemaid.com/history/ 
Note 19. https://www.floridasnatural.com/who-we-are/ 
Note 20. https://www.revolvy.com/page/Simply-Orange-Juice-Company 
Note 21. W are grateful to Austin Elkins of IT dept., Northern Ky University fot technical assistance. 
Note 22. This data is from food stores with sales of over $ 2 million, and drug stores over $ 1 million; it 
also includes discount stores, such as Target and K-Mart, but excludes Wal-Mart as well as warehouse 
clubs, e.g., Sam’s Club, Costco, and BJ’s. It also does not include the “dollar” stores, such as Dollar 
General, and others. 
Note 23. For those stores for which, during a week, there were feature ads, coupon ads, display, or 
temporary price decrease of at least 5%. 
Note 24. The six classes are: “The Poor”, “The Near Poor”, “Traditional Middle Class”, “The 
Upper-Middle Class”, “The Very Rich/The Rich”, and “The Mega Rich—Masters of the Universe”. 
Note 25. Of the 32 brands in Table 1, only six were 59-oz packs, and 26 were 64-oz packs. Since the 
two sizes are pretty close to each other, we have treated them as a single group. 
Note 26. Sales of 59 oz included with sales of 64 oz. 
Note 27. http://www.pepsico.com/Investors/Annual-Reports-and-Proxy-Information 
Note 28. https://www.coca-colacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/fileassets/pdf/2018/ 
2017-10K.pdf 
Note 29. Businesses with sale of over $ 1 Million. 
 
 
 
